Deconstructing diasporic mobilisation at a time of crisis: perspectives from the Palestinian and Greek diasporas by Elizabeth Mavroudi (1254813)
Deconstructing diasporic mobilisation at a time of crisis: Perspectives from 
the Palestinian and Greek diasporas 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on the difficulties that diasporas face in relation to mobilising 
around helping the homeland at a time of crisis, using qualitative research on the 
Greek and Palestinian diasporas. Rather than assume that long-distance 
nationalism, emotional attachment to the homeland and diasporic obligation will  
galvanise diasporic populations into assisting, and mobilising around, the homeland, 
the paper argues that those in diasporas do not necessarily help their homelands in 
times of crisis, even if they have strong socio-cultural connections to it. At times of 
crisis these feelings are heightened but not do not always translate into direct action; 
this may especially be the case at times of prolonged crisis when past efforts to help 
do not seem to have worked. This paper argues that it is often hard for those in 
diaspora to find long-term and meaningful ways to help at a time of crisis and many 
question the effectiveness of their actions if they do not see positive outcomes over 
time. The paper demonstrates that trying to help the homeland can therefore be a 
frustrating process and can make those in diaspora feel distanced and isolated from 
the homeland due to their inability to find concrete ways to help. This can be 
especially the case when they have no formal political voice in the homeland and 
disagree with government policies and activities.  
 
Introduction 
A central aim of this paper is to add to the literature on diaspora mobilisation at times 
of crisis. In particular, it seeks to examine the disconnect between emotional 
attachments those members of a diaspora may have with a homeland and 
mobilisation. In other words, the paper will stress that despite having strong linkages 
to, and identification with,  the homeland and a diasporic group, there is no 
guarantee that those in diaspora can be counted upon to mobilise and help their 
homeland at a time of crisis. It is this key contribution that the paper seeks to make, 
adding to what is already a rich amount of literature on diaspora mobilisation by 
exploring whether members of two diasporic groups, the Palestinian and the Greek, 
mobilise around two different types of crisis: conflict and statelessness for the former 
and economic for the latter, using qualitative research. It does, as the introduction to 
this special issue states (Koinova forthcoming), make a contribution to literature on 
theorisations and analyses of diaspora mobilisation in relation to contested 
sovereignty and fragile homeland states.  It is not the aim of this paper to examine in 
detail the nature of these crises; they are being used as case studies to help 
demonstrate the importance of the temporal realities of diaspora mobilisation. What 
matters is that such crises elicit an emotional response for those in diaspora who feel 
attached to the homeland. Two questions then arise, which this paper seeks to 
address: do those in diaspora feel compelled to act, or to mobilise to help the 
homeland at a time of crisis? And if so, do they feel their actions are useful? In doing 
so, the paper discusses a potential disjuncture between strong feelings of diasporic 
identity and belonging on the one hand and weak diasporic mobilisation on the other.  
 
Brinkerhoff (2008, 68) defines mobilisation as 'purposive action', and Müller-Funk 
(2016, 354) defines diaspora mobilisation as political activity which crosses one or 
more borders. The paper defines mobilisation in broad terms as 'helping' the 
homeland in material ways, be it through small acts of charity or taking in part in 
demonstrations, to everyday advocating in favour of a cause. Therefore, it focuses 
on what Koinova (2013) calls 'moderate contention' which are more established, less 
radical or extreme ways to mobilise, which can either be weak or strong. It is 
important to examine diaspora mobilisation, particularly in relation to long-distance 
nationalism and diasporic identity formation, as diasporic negotiations of home and 
belonging become ever more complex (Blunt 2007; Mavroudi 2007; Brinkerhoff 2016; 
Christou and Mavroudi 2015). Research on diaspora mobilisation needs to take into 
account these juxtapositions and examine the many different (dis)connections 
between here and there more closely and in inter-related ways, whereby diasporas 
are viewed as both transgressing and maintaining boundaries and borders  
(Brubaker 2005). In particular, there is a need to unpack the realities of diasporic 
action (or inaction) at times of crisis as well as the 'moral co-responsibility' and 
obligations of those in diaspora (Werbner 2002) which are based within people's 
everyday lives and social worlds (Page and Mercer 2012). Elite, as well as non elite 
members of a diaspora may choose to mobilise but may struggle to do so. It is these 
realities of (in)action and non mobilisation which this paper is concerned with. It 
examines how ordinary members of diaspora engage with mobilisation, and outlines 
the constraints and limitations which they feel they face. The next section of the 
paper provides a literature review on diaspora mobilisation, as well as a short 
description of the methods. Next, contextual information on both case studies is 
presented. The two case studies are then discussed separately, followed by a brief 
comparative analysis and conclusions.  
 
Deconstructing diaspora mobilisation 
Despite the potentially useful role that those in diaspora can play in mobilising for a 
homeland, questions remain about their ability, extent and willingness to do so 
(Beyene 2015). Whilst there are examples of positive effects on, for example, in 
terms of creating democracy in the homeland  (Bernal 2006; Brinkerhoff 2012) some 
remain sceptical about the ability of those in diaspora to help the homeland at a time 
of crisis (Carter 2005; Cochrane 2007; Ǿstergaard Nielsen 2003; Anti-Boateng 2012) 
and others argue that context is important in such analyses (Shain 2002; Koinova 
2011).  Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2013) stresses that many questions remain unanswered 
in terms of assumptions about diaspora involvement. She highlights that there is also 
a need to focus on individual members of diasporas more, rather than assume that 
those in diaspora act as a collective. We can extend these concerns and ask whether 
what tends to encourage or hinder diasporic mobilisation? Indeed, whilst there has 
been much research on diaspora mobilisation more broadly, there has been less on 
non-elite mobilisation (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013) and on exactly how those in diaspora 
mobilise in relation to political struggles (Baser 2014; Madriaga Quinsaat 2016). 
There is therefore a need to unpack who is involved in diaspora mobilisation (Carter 
2005; Kleist 2008; Yeh 2007; McConnell 2015), as well as the assumptions made 
about identities, obligations and diasporic activities (Faist 2008).  
 
Despite the research which highlights how diasporas are able to respond to 
homeland crises (see Koinova 2011, for example), there is a need to more closely 
examine situations and contexts where diaspora mobilisation may be selective or 
limited. Brinkerhoff (2008) outlines the linkages between diasporic identity and 
mobilisation, stressing that there are specific factors which can aid mobilisation: 
shared social identity, dense and heterogeneous (ie non hierarchical) social networks 
and 'opportunity structures' (Esman 1986; also Müller-Funk 2016 on political 
opportunity structures prevalent in the host country as a factor). She goes on to 
discuss how motivation for mobilisation is linked to many factors such as a need to 
demonstrate or protect diasporic identity, organisational efficiency in framing a cause 
and demonstrating that action leads to impact and self-efficacy or feelings of 
empowerment. To this end, she argues that 'Self-efficacy combines with motivation 
to determine the likelihood of mobilization' (Brinkerhoff 2008, 77). Their identity plays 
a role because it can influence how they feel about their group solidarity and can 
help determine whether they feel it is worth mobilising on its behalf. Work has also 
shown how those in diaspora navigate obligations and expectations to mobilise and 
help the homeland at a time of crisis; for some this creates feelings of 'diaspora 
fatigue' (Shain and Barth 2003, 463), such as detachment, isolation, and guilt, which 
can translate into not wanting to mobilise or get involved in homeland affairs (Jones 
2014)1. Shain and Barth (2003, 452) categorise members of diaspora into three 
groups: 
 
 (1) Core members are the organizing elites, intensively active in diasporic affairs and 
in a position to appeal for mobilization of the larger diaspora. 
(2) Passive members are likely to be available for mobilization when the active 
leadership calls upon them. 
(3) Silent members are a larger pool of people who are generally uninvolved in 
diasporic affairs but who may mobilize in times of crises. 
 
They also divide diasporas into 'active' and 'passive' diasporas, the former 
influencing host and homeland policies, the latter not. They argue that for active 
diasporas to be successful, they need motive, opportunity and means. The homeland 
                                                          
1
 This stresses the need to examine more closely the emotions of diaspora mobilisation from the 
bottom up and at the micro-scale, which takes place within people's everyday lives. This stresses the 
grounded and situated nature of action and experience. 
and host society are seen as linked in the process. Mobilisation is perceived as more 
likely to occur if it is identity-reinforcing and where the right conditions occur in both 
the homeland and host country. The right conditions include ways to be politically 
active, integration, and host country attitudes towards the homeland and vice versa.  
 
However, such categorisations and approaches imply that mobilisation occurs in an 
orderly, rational, predictable way, and that certain members of diaspora can always 
be relied upon to act (or not). In addition, it also seems to suggest that silent (and 
possibly passive) members are less likely to mobilise because of their lack of 
involvement in diasporic affairs. Research demonstrates how diaspora mobilisation 
itself is an active, potentially unstable, and needs to be learnt, created and 
negotiated (Page and Mercer 2012; Demir 2015).  
 
The paper will engage with these issues using the case studies of diasporic 
Palestinians in Athens, and of Greeks in Australia. Both case studies are based on 
qualitative research comprising in-depth interviews with these two different diasporic 
groups with homelands facing different types of crisis. The first case study involved 
speaking to 54 members of the Palestinian diaspora in Athens, Greece and the 
research for this was carried out in 2003-2004 over a period of approximately 9 
months. These were mostly first generation migrants who started arriving from the 
1980s onwards, thirty three of whom were men and twenty of whom were women2. 
The second case study was conducted in the early months of 2012 with members of 
the Greek diaspora in Canberra and Melbourne3. The two locations were chosen for 
the 'success' of their Greek communities.  In total, 50 interviews were completed, 
with mainly first and second generation diasporic Greeks, 26 men and 24 women.  
 
It should be stressed that these two pieces of research were not designed to be 
comparative and thus this paper is exploratory in nature. The paper uses the two 
case studies to discuss the hindrances to, and feelings towards, diaspora 
mobilisation, in relation to diasporic identity, belonging and attachment to the 
homeland. For both diasporic groups, as wide a cross-section of people were spoken 
to, especially in terms of socio-economic background; most were non-elite but the 
research also included some elites such as community and religious leaders.  All 
interviews were conversational in style and used interview guides based around 
themes the researcher wished to explore. This created more freedom and flexibility 
for both researcher and participant and allowed for deeper discussion. All names 
appearing in the paper are pseudonyms in line with ethical considerations. 
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 For more on the different Palestinian ‘groups’ in Greece, see Shawa 2005. 
3
 The Greek-Australian case study this paper is based on was funded by an Australian National 
University Centre for European Studies Visiting Fellowship. 
Contexts 
 
Palestinians in diaspora 
Palestinians have been living in diaspora since 1948 or what they call the year of the 
nakba (or catastrophe) and the creation of the state of Israel (Masalha 2008). They 
are dispersed mainly throughout the Middle East but also the rest of the world. It was 
only as a consequence (both directly and indirectly) of the 1967 Israeli occupation, 
the ensuing political turbulence and resistance, as well as the escalating 
discrimination towards Palestinians in some Arab countries that more large-scale 
migration to Europe began. According to the Palestinian Representation in Athens, at 
the time of research there were roughly 4000 Palestinians living in Greece.  
 
The ongoing impasse in the Palestinian territories, the continued violence in the 
region, the lack of a territorially defined independent homeland state, and the 
disagreements around the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees constitute the 
main aspects of a cause which serves to unify and connect Palestinian in diaspora. It 
is these issues, which have been ongoing since 1948 and yet to be resolved, which 
galvanise diasporic Palestinian mobilisation, politicisation, long-distance nation-
building and homeland-oriented politics in different contexts (Lindholm Schulz 2003) 
although their statelessness has also lead to disillusionment (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
2016). However, within this, there is also the realisation that Palestinian cultural and 
political identities in diaspora are dynamic, potentially ambivalent and that 
Palestinians feel torn between here and there (Cox and Connell 2003; Mason 2007; 
Koinova 2014). In Greece, such commitment to the cause was evident, with strong 
feelings of 'Palestinan-ness' and close connections to the Palestinian territories and 
other places where Palestinians live in diaspora, such as Lebanon. However, their 
long-distance nationalism and need to mobilise around the cause needs to be 
unpacked and examined further, in order to ascertain the realities  of mobilisation 
and helping the homeland at a time of prolonged crisis. One of the main issues 
related to this is the often lack of citizenship for Palestinians in Greece, and the 
accompanying lack of formal political rights both in Greece and in their homeland, 
which means that they do not have a formal political voice with which to be heard 
and use as part of their mobilisation. This is because of the ius sanguinis citizenship 
policy followed in Greece (Tsitselikis 2007) which makes it hard for non Greeks to 
attain Greek citizenship.  
 
Greeks in diaspora 
There is a long history of Greeks migrating with a dip in emigration in the early days 
of Greek independence when nation-building in the new state was seen as 
paramount (Prevelakis 1998). However, this changed after 1880 when new waves of 
Greek emigration began towards North and South America, Africa and Australia. The 
main period of emigration to Australia began after World War 2 rising to over 15,000 
by 1940 but it was after 1952 (until 1974) that over 250, 000 Greeks and Greek 
Cypriots made their way to Australia (Tamis 2005). Initially, most were male, 
uneducated and unskilled. It was only from the 1960s onwards that more female 
Greeks arrived and this generation aimed to permanently settle in Australia. Greeks 
in Australia are seen a 'success story' in the sense that they are perceived to have 
integrated into Australia, hold Australian citizenship and are able to participate fully in 
Australian cultural, political, social and economic life (Tamis 2005). Their relationship 
with the homeland has been one typified by connection. This is demonstrated by 
romanticisation of the homeland, strong feelings of belonging to Greece culturally, 
but also identities that are negotiated in fluid, and complex ways, especially in the 
second and third generations (Tamis and Tsolakis 1999; Tamis 2005; Tsolidis and 
Pollard 2010). Less is known about Greek diasporic economic connections and 
activities, which formed the starting point of this research. However, there are hints 
that Greeks in Australia could do more in terms of homeland-oriented business 
development and economic linkages with the homeland (Chrisodoulidis 2010; Hugo 
and Bakalis 2009; Hugo and Bakalis 2014). Given the economic crisis in Greece 
which began in 2008, there is a timely need for analysis on the role that the Greek 
diaspora can play in mobilising to help the homeland, particularly at a time of 
economic and political crisis (Hugo and Bakalis (2014). 
 
The two contexts and groups are very different and this paper does not attempt to 
crudely and simplistically compare the two whilst glossing over important differences; 
rather, it is using these two diasporic groups in different locations at different times, 
using different crises to make some observations on the nature of diasporic 
mobilisation. It is not meant, nor was it designed as, a comparative study. The two 
pieces of work were conducted independently of eachother, but the methods used 
were similar. What holds for both diasporic groups is the attachment they feel 
towards their homeland and their feeling of belonging to their respective diasporas: 
this is a key shared variable which acts as a starting point for an exploration of their 
mobilisation to take place.   
 
Mobilising around a Palestinian cause in diaspora: from politicised identities to 
uncertainty  
 
Palestinians in Greece took part in some mobilisation activities based around support 
and advocacy of the cause, namely through demonstrations, cultural activities and 
support of charities helping Palestinians in the homeland. However, they also 
occasionally mobilised through more personal strategies such as ensuring children 
were raised as Palestinian. This section analyses the hindrances to such mobilisation 
and the feelings involved in doing so. In interviews, Palestinian participants displayed 
strong feelings of politicised Palestinian-ness, reminiscent of long-distance 
nationalism, whereby nation-building and the need to portray a unified and strategic 
Palestinian nation for the purposes of self-determination was evident. This occurred, 
in particular, through the choice of words used to express feelings and the fact that 
interviews were often emotionally laden, sometimes polemical in nature and imbued 
with a mixture of different, sometimes competing emotions. This included sadness at 
feelings of exile, and loss but also defiance and strength in terms of their ability to 
continue feeling Palestinian in diaspora. This is in line with other observations on 
Palestinian national identities in diaspora; for example, the Palestinian ‘name’ and 
national identity has been seen as being born in ‘exile’ (Said 1990, 360). 
 
Such nation-building was linked to emotional feelings of belonging and attachment to 
the Palestinian territories, and to the Middle East more broadly. For Palestinians in 
Athens, such constructions of national identity appeared to be linked to the need to 
belong to a specific homeland or territory. As Heela4 stresses: 'everyone needs 
roots... your identity, where you belong is a very important aspect of your life, of who 
you are ... it defines you as a person'. Such views often went hand in hand with a 
need to rally around the injustice and suffering they felt Palestinians had endured, as 
well as a need to voice opinions about the cause, such as the loss of Palestinian 
territory and a Palestinian homeland: 
 
From 1948, those who left then, they cannot go back. My father, when he left, 
he was 14,15 years old and he has been wounded by a Jewish bullet and so 
he remembers and he wishes so much that he could return to his wonderful 
country. This is why it is etched into our minds that this country is ours. We 
have to get it back because let's say you have your house with its rooms, 
kitchen and bathroom and someone comes with force and says I'm going to 
live and stay in your house now. I'm going to take these two rooms and the 
kitchen and you can have the toilet. Would you accept that seeing as the 
house is yours? You have to fight to get it back (Ibrahim5). 
 
Stories of exile were common, and were linked to the Palestinian cause, and the 
need for strategic and politicised unity in diaspora. Lina6, for example, describes how 
her family lost everything in 1948 and had to start from scratch. Her family story and 
the situation in the region have galvanised her politicisation: 'We have nothing left. I 
don't want to go until it's free land. I believe strongly that one day it will come back to 
us... they say in Arabic that blood never becomes water, so the land is built on the 
blood of the Palestinians'.  
 
The need to secure a solution to the impasse, not just for themselves, but primarily 
for their children and future generations was a common feeling amongst participants 
and demonstrates commitment to mobilise for the Palestinian cause. Although many 
participants perceived a two state solution as a way forward, other participants were 
less sure what solution they were mobilising in favour of, even though they felt 
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 Office worker, female, from Jordan. Interview conducted in Athens, 13th January 2004, 8pm. 
5
 Construction worker, male, from Safad. Interview conducted in Athens, 24th October  2003, 8pm. 
6
 Businesswoman from Jaffa. Interview conducted in Athens, 15th December 2003, 5pm. 
politicised and that there was a need to try and do something to help the situation. 
This demonstrates how mobilisation for a cause can be rife with uncertainty, 
ambivalence, and helplessness over not only what outcome they are seeking, but 
also how to go about achieving it from afar. This is especially the case when the 
situation has been going on for so long; views and opinions change and people 
become disillusioned. As Maha7 explained, although she thinks 'it's very important for 
Palestinians to spread the word, to give the other side, our side of the story, it's very 
important, it's part of the struggle', she came to be uncertain as to what she wanted 
in terms of a solution. A large part of this stemmed from her emotional response to 
the situation there and it was clear she was visibly upset by the situation and her 
inability to know what to do about it: 
 
I have 2 children and I don't want them to see this suffering. When I see the 
wall, when I see the people going through these checkpoints...[it is upsetting] I 
am one of the people [who didn't] want.. or thought that we could live in one 
state, as 2 peoples under one state but now I cannot see that, no way can I see 
that after this and I cannot see a state with 22% of the land, I cannot, because 
every time we ask, they ask more, every time we want, they want more, so with 
this, we cannot find a solution, we cannot. 
 
Other respondents, such as Mustafa8, admitted that they felt they were more able to 
think about the situation there objectively as a result of the peace of mind they got 
from freedom of expression: 'You have to be open-minded and objective in order to 
understand all points of view and you know I learnt to be like this here. It's very hard 
to think openly and objectively there because you are so close to the problems, the 
stress'. 
 
This highlights one of the benefits of being in diaspora, and of mobilising from afar in 
a country such as Greece, which has been sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and 
people, particularly when the left wing PASOK political party was in power in the 
1980s (Agnantopoulos 2007). Initial impressions of constructions of Palestinian 
national identity may have emerged as being potentially narrow and 'unified' around 
the cause. However, further unpacking of their identities and opinions in diaspora 
revealed that many felt ambivalent about the merging of 'here' and 'there' and were 
also willing to think more openly and radically about the peace process, and to be 
tolerant of Jews. It also points to the dynamic nature of diasporic identities, opinions, 
and subsequently of mobilisation, which change over time and space.  
 
For Palestinians in Athens, a factor influencing not just their opinions but their 
feelings about mobilisation, and their propensity to act, was their lack of formal 
political status: 'What can we do? We are not Greek citizens, so we cannot influence 
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 Housewife from Nablus. Interview conducted in Athens, 15th December 2003, 8pm. 
8
 Unemployed male, from Hebron. Interview conducted in Athens, January 28th 2004, 9pm. 
the Greek government or politics. We are helpless here as foreigners; all we can do 
is tell people about the situation; this is very important' (Majid).9 So, despite the 
historical legacy of a pro-Palestinian Greek state, the inaccessibility of Greek 
citizenship made acting politically in a formal sense difficult and meant that 
participants had to rely on talking about their emotions, belonging and the situation in 
the Middle East to anyone who would listen, often within their everyday lives. This 
included speaking to Greeks, such as colleagues at work, other Palestinians in 
diaspora in each other's homes but also more forcefully in demonstrations, which 
some participants attended. 
 
Others also felt that the Palestinian Authority (PA), set up after the Oslo Agreement 
in 1993 as a path to Palestinian governance, had not been concerned with the 
diaspora and they felt ignored, and even though they were keen to help their 
homeland, they found it hard to do so in formal political ways: 'Here we don't have 
the opportunity to affect what's going on there.... the fact that we cannot vote is a 
problem. They [the PA] don't care about Palestinians living outside Palestine and it is 
a big problem' (Faeq)10. 
 
Many respondents also saw lack of time as a major restriction to engaging in 
advocacy and only those who were extremely politicised and committed to the cause 
and had the time, networks and financial resources were able to help on more than a 
superficial, occasional basis. This highlights the need to place diaspora mobilisation 
within the context of people's everyday lives (Page and Mercer 2012). The mundane 
realities of living in diaspora and coping on a day to day basis can be draining, 
especially when one factors in the guilt many feel that they are not there and 
suffering in the same way as Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Diaspora 
mobilisation requires effort, which for some is simply too time consuming. Therefore, 
the extent to which Palestinians feel they are able to mobilise and help is dependent 
on personal factors such as financial and citizenship statuses.   
 
Lina11, despite the freedom she feels and the fact that does a great deal to help 
fellow Palestinians, outlines the fact that such help and advocacy is not 
straightforward. Thus, her perceptions of helping are both positive and negative: 
'Palestinians who have money...don't have to think how to survive [but] others, 
they're worrying how to get money, to live, and then in their free time they participate, 
but in general...most of the Palestinians here are very close to each other...Many 
people would like to help'. 
 
It is evident that she perceives that help begins in diaspora, assisting fellow 
Palestinians who are struggling. Her feelings of advocacy and 'helping' are dynamic 
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 Foreign Company Employee, male, from Safad. Interview conducted 11th November 2003, 8pm. 
10
 Foreign Company employee, male, from Lebanon. Interview conducted in Athens, November 16th 
2003, 10 am. 
11
 Businesswoman from Jaffa. Interview conducted in Athens, 15th December 2003, 5pm. 
and hard to pin down, ranging from optimism, pessimism to guilt; this is neatly 
illustrated by the view she gives later on in the same discussion: 
 
Yes, [it makes me feel helpless] I would like to put every month say one or two 
hundred euro to support one family there, because I can afford it but I'm not 
sure that this money would go to this family, you're never sure.... 
 
I: Do you think that Palestinians here could do more? 
 
Lina: No. I believe that we should keep on trying or keep on supporting and 
when I said that there's always more we can do, I meant continuously, to 
continue support because really there are many Palestinian families who need 
supporting big time. And there is much more we could do politically, I suppose, 
although it's hard being here. 
 
Therefore, there is uncertainty over how to mobilise and help fellow Palestinians, and 
over whether what they are doing is actually making any difference. This is not least 
because of factors such as the scale of poverty in the Palestinian territories and 
corruption as Lina above alludes to. This can make them feel apathetic, helpless and 
disillusioned. However, despite this, one must not assume that these people do not 
feel politicised or that they do not feel Palestinian. Their emotional connection to the 
homeland seemed to both galvanise and hinder their mobilisation. Therefore, there is 
a juxtaposition and disconnect between such feelings of politicised Palestinian 
identity, which were prevalent amongst participants, and the limited and often 
fragmented mobilisation many felt they could partake in. This does not prevent them 
from feeling Palestinian, politicised or from engaging in mobilisation. Even though it 
does appear that at times of specific need, many Palestinians in Athens are willing to 
actively help, there are severe limitations on this mobilisation if it has to be sustained 
over a lengthy period of time. 
 
Mobilising diasporic Greeks at a time of economic crisis 
The backdrop to this research was the Greek financial and political crisis which 
began in 2008, which is ongoing at the time of writing and has resulted in enormous 
debt and a crippled economy (for more on this see Karagiannis and Kondeas 2012). 
It was clear from the research conducted that the vast majority of participants felt a 
cultural affinity with Greece, and that, in line with other research on the Greek 
diaspora in different contexts, they felt this connection to be an emotional one 
(Christou 2011).  The question that remains, however, is to what extent do these 
professed feelings of belonging to the homeland translate into concrete and material 
mobilisation at a time of crisis. For diasporic Greeks in Australia, such mobilisation 
around political and economic issues was decoupled from cultural attachment to 
Greece. For them, the economic and political crisis revolved around corruption, poor 
governance, challenging bureaucracy and an inefficient public sector. There was little 
sympathy for Greece's politicians and elites, and a pervading view that there was 
little they could do to help Greece at a time of economic crisis. However, if we 
unpack this further we see that many were cynical about their own mobilisation 
because of past negative experiences; this did not mean they did not want to help, 
but rather they felt it was often futile. This was linked to past experience of sending 
money, which was not then used to actually help people on the ground, which made 
them cynical and less likely to send money again. The views of Irini12 are illustrative: 
There is a general feeling of bitterness, like when there were a couple of 
earthquakes the Greek community generated hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to help with the relief. Not that any of the money went to the people 
that needed it as we subsequently found out but we did our bit...so I think that 
has made people a bit weary. There’ll still be efforts and assistance but I do 
think there’s a general feeling of well is the money going to get there? 
There is clearly willingness to help during times of crisis, as the quotes demonstrate. 
However, they also show the realities people face when trying to help, and their 
frustration with corruption and bureaucracy, especially when they compared it to the 
context in Australia which they were used to and felt was more organised, more 
transparent, less bureaucratic and was better governed. Even if people want to help 
at a time of crisis, and feel obligated to, trust can be issue, and they may struggle to 
find the best way to help: 
So with the fires, we were quite happy [to help] but we sent the money 
through the International Red Cross because we knew if it went to someone 
Greek, you know where would the money go? Their biggest problem is 
themselves and I believe that if they were trustworthy they wouldn’t be having 
a problem right now, the Greeks outside of Greece would have helped them 
out already13.  
xxx 
I feel that we have a moral obligation to help in some way. How we do that is 
a difficult question. Last year or the year before they asked the ten richest 
Greek business men if they would send money back to Greece. And most of 
them didn’t bother answering, but some of them did say 'no', because they 
have seen the Greeks waste the money14.  
Their experiences of living in Australia, where economic and political systems were 
perceived to be more transparent, professional, and less corrupt also seemed to 
influence their cynicism about mobilisation and their perceptions of the situation in 
Greece. From the quotes above, there is also a clear division being drawn between 
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 Female, second generation. Interview conducted 31st January 2012, 10am, in Melbourne. 
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 Alexi, second generation male. Interview conducted in Canberra, 16th January 2012, 11am. 
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 Yiorgos, second generation male. Interview conducted in Canberra, 27th January 2012, 2pm. 
'us' (in Australia) and 'them' (in Greece) and there is a feeling that they are different. 
Clearly there is a need to critique any assumptions about the extent to which those in 
diaspora share views, perceptions and identities with those in the homeland. Those 
in diaspora are not simply an extension of those in the homeland, on whom 
homeland governments can blindly depend on, or engage with at will. The emotional 
connections that those in diaspora may feel towards their homeland can co-exist 
alongside disconnections, disillusionment and apathy. However, these emotional 
connections can also lead to sympathy and compassion for those suffering in the 
homeland and frustration and guilt that there is little they feel they can do to help 
especially when they see that things do not change for the better over time: 
Most people don't really want [to help]. They think often that it serves Greeks 
right because of the shocking practices of governments in the last 30, 40, 50 
years. People who have gone over get frustrated at how cumbersome and 
bureaucratic the system is and feel [the crisis] was long time coming. People 
can make connections to their family, and even there you think up to a point 
and how am I going to help?...The concept of Greece is just another idea 
which grows more distant – why would you really care that much, alright yes, 
your heritage is there and stuff like that but you don’t really connect with it , 
because you’re hardly ever there15.  
This quote also stresses the issue of distance and disconnection. Although we may 
assume that those in diaspora are always connected to their homeland, the reality is 
that people cannot physically be in two places at the same time even if they are 
emotionally and everyday life in one's country of residence takes over, especially if 
they are not able to visit the homeland often. The fact that they cannot help even 
though they might want to, coupled with Australian perceptions of Greece can be 
hard to deal with and can create defensiveness against ridicule:  'It hurts me that 
Greece is going through this because ...the country is being ridiculed... you know you 
can criticise your own family but when the outsider criticises it, it’s not on'16. Clearly, 
he feels connected to Greece despite living so far away but this emotional 
attachment can make things harder when they feel they cannot help in any 
meaningful way. This, rather than galvanise activity, can subdue it and make people 
'switch off' and lack confidence, as Dimitri17 says: 
I think if people here could, they would like to be able to help but I feel that 
not too many willing to go and say how can I help?  Because they don’t have 
the confidence to say OK we’ll come and help you – but is that going to help 
you in the long term?  A lot of money was poured into Greece [in the past] to 
help improve standards.. I don’t think it was utilised in the proper way. 
                                                          
15
 Christos, second generation male. Interview conducted in Melbourne, 18th January 2012, 11am 
16
 Christos, second generation male. Interview conducted in Melbourne, 18th January 2012, 11am 
17
 Dimitri, first generation male. Interview conducted in Canberra, 2nd February 2012, 4pm. 
For diasporic Greek participants in Australia, mobilisation often manifested itself in 
helping family and in personal ways, where there was more trust and there were 
more assurances that the money would be spent properly and would actually be 
useful. Many felt there were few incentives to help in other ways and that the 
bureaucratic and corrupt systems in Greece meant that investment in enterprise was 
limited, and that helping charities was also problematic for these reasons. Although, 
as work has commented (Hugo and Bakalis 2009; Hugo and Bakalis 2014), there 
appears to be the potential for stronger economic linkages between Greece and 
Australia, which could theoretically be used at a time of crisis, this potential was not 
being realised.  
 
Different contexts, similar feelings towards mobilisation? A brief comparison 
The paper has demonstrated that in terms of predicting diasporic mobilisation, it does 
not matter whether those in diaspora are citizens or not of the host or homeland, 
whether the homeland is a state, or not, whether there are strong organisational and 
social networks, whether a crisis is economic or political. Such factors, which are 
stressed in the diaspora mobilisation literature, do not seem to be important in these 
two case studies. Both Greece and Australia provide seemingly good contexts for 
diaspora mobilisation in terms of dense social networks and diasporic leadership.  
Certain themes  also cross-cut both case studies: the length of the crisis and how 
protracted it is; uncertainty about how best to help; and related to this, trust and 
perceptions of corruption in the homeland. For both groups, there was ambivalence 
about their mobilisation during the crises under exploration. This appeared to stem 
from their strong feelings of emotional attachment to the homeland. This connection 
meant they did care about their homeland and 'ordinary' people caught up in crisis, 
but they often felt guilty and disillusioned because they did not know how best to help 
them. The only context that seems to matter is the homeland: in both case studies, 
participants felt attached emotionally and culturally to it  and they were affected by 
homeland crises and this led them to consider mobilising. However, the realities of 
helping 'on the ground' were often difficult in both case studies.  
 
This serves as a reminder that the motivation and the means to mobilise are both 
needed. What linked both case studies was an abundance of the former but a lack of 
the latter; 'diaspora fatigue' (Shain and Barth 2003, 463) was also present for both 
because the crisis for both groups is ongoing, and because of a lack of trust in the 
outcome and impact of diaspora mobilisation attempts. Rather than being galvanised 
by a crisis, both groups struggled with disillusionment and apathy. However, this did 
not mean that they were any less connected emotionally or culturally to their 
homeland. To go back to Brinkerhoff (2008) who argued that people in diaspora are 
more likely to mobilise if they can see a positive outcome, this holds true. However, 
she also argued that mobilisation is also centred around identity protection. The 
participants in the two case studies were seemingly concerned with promoting their 
diasporic identity, and were proud of it. However, rather than this automatically 
galvanising action, whether or not they mobilised depended on their own personal 
feelings of empowerment, their trust in whether their mobilisation attempts were 
useful and/or subject to corruption and inefficiency. All these factors, it is important to 
stress again, did not seem to impact on their feelings of strong diasporic identity. In 
other words, any feelings of apathy or disillusionment in terms of mobilisation did not 
translate back into negative perceptions of diasporic identity and belonging. This 
means that there is always the potential for them to wish to mobilise, and in the 
future, to mobilise more successfully, if their feelings of trust increase, or if they can 
find more effective ways to mobilise. Indeed, it was also apparent that rather than 
being rational actors who sought to maximise their position and ability to help their 
homeland, the ways in which they talked about their mobilisation highlighted the 
messy nature of diaspora mobilisation.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper has contributed to the literature on diaspora mobilisation by 
demonstrating a disjuncture between strong emotional belonging to the homeland 
and mobilisation. In other words, such belonging does not guarantee action and we 
cannot assume there will be automatic mobilisation by people who feel part of a 
diaspora and deeply linked to a homeland. This paper has explored the disconnect 
and disjuncture between professed diasporic identity and connections to the 
homeland, on the one hand, and the realities of weak, ineffective or nonexistent 
diasporic mobilisation, and of limitations and constraints to such mobilisation at times 
of crisis, on the other.  Strong diasporic identities are therefore not necessarily a 
precursor to, or a springboard for, mobilisation.  
 
This paper suggests that those in diaspora often appear to feel disillusioned by their 
attempts to help the homeland at a time of crisis even when there are many factors 
which provide the 'right' conditions for mobilisation, such as motivation, and strong 
identity. The means to mobilise also existed in both contexts but participants did not 
necessarily find them satisfactory or trustworthy. Context in this paper, as the 
introduction to this special issue highlights (Koinova, forthcoming), matters because 
the issue of time is important for both diasporas and both crises. The length and 
timing of the homeland crisis affected those in diaspora and their propensity to 
mobilise. Although it has been noted that diaspora engagement with the homeland is 
a 'craft' to be learnt (Page and Tanyi 2015), this process of learning is one of trial and 
error and  not necessarily easy. Not only does it take time, but potentially occurs in 
peaks and troughs, or not at all. More attention arguably needs to be paid to the 
timespace of diaspora mobilisation (and migration more generally) as the introduction 
to this special issue stresses (Koinova, forthcoming; also see Mavroudi, Page and 
Christou forthcoming).  
 
This suggests that diaspora mobilisation can be hard to categorise and predict 
because it can depend on a mixture of deep feelings such as hope and loyalty (which 
can lead to mobilisation) as well as despair and guilt (which can lead to a lack of 
mobilisation) and people have many different feelings. In other words, people may 
feel conflicted and have changeable thoughts about mobilisation.  To categorise 
them as either 'passive', 'silent' or 'active' (Shain and Barth 2003) ignores the 
complexity of their feelings and how they may slip between such groupings over time 
and space. This is also linked to their complicated, multiple, flexible identities and 
feelings of belonging, which are often hybrid, ambivalent and 'hard to pin down'. This 
stresses the importance of emotions in research on diasporic identity (Christou 
2011), which arguably needs more attention in the literature on diaspora mobilisation.  
 
This paper also reminds us that homeland governments cannot necessarily rely on 
the support or help of diasporas, which needs to be considered in potential diaspora 
strategies (Ho 2015; Larner 2007; Jöns, Mavroudi and Heffernan 2015). At times of 
crisis, in weak states and regions where sovereignty is contested, governments and 
those in positions of power, such as diasporic leaders and activists, need to do more 
to win over the trust of those in diaspora, in order to demonstrate that actions yield 
some sort of results, even small, incremental ones. Although diasporas undoubtedly 
can help their homelands in positive ways at a time of crisis, more research is 
needed to uncover the limitations and opportunities in relation to such activity.  
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